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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 7, 1980 alledged officers Richard Hanna and Dennis 
Cox went upon the defendants property in an illegal trespass ( Consult 
property survey and note footage) at approx. JsOO P.M. knowing defendant 
was at the hospital with his wife who was about to have a baby. 
( Trans. pg. 160 L-6-10 Pg 164 L. 4-5. Acting on their own, 
motivated by Dennis Cox political ambitions (Consult pg. 161 L. 5-9 
and pg. 209 L. 10-11) running against Lynn Cartwright for sheriff. 
The two alledged officers picked three leaves of white material called 
it marijuana and used said leaves to obtain an illegal and unsigned 
search warrant •. ( Consult Motion to Dismiss trans. pg 81 line 8). 
Both a.lledged officers knew they were prohibited from acting as· 
peace officers (Consult letters from police academy and' Attorney 
'Generals opinion ). But they convinced the justice of the peace to 
issue search warrant not under oath or affirmation (Consult Motion 
to Dismiss pg. 122 L. 10-25 pg. 123 L. 1-10) However the J.P. wasn't 
going to assume any responsibility so he crossed out that he certified 
to any truth therein. At 6s50 P.M. after calling in more uncertified 
peace officers they again illegally searched defendants property, home 
automobile ect. ( In reading through this brief bear in mind there was 
seven uncertified officers who know they could possibly be liaba.ble 
for each others actions). 
Arugument 1. 
Illegal trepass ·which was stated in court a.~d evidence surpressed 
(Consult, Motion to Dismiss pg. 109 L. 20-J - pg 110 L. 20-25- Pg. 
161 L. 15-17 - Prelimin Trans. pg. 64 L.lJ-25 pg. 65 L. 1-2. There 
was no record kept of evidence char.ging hands for thirteen months. 
It was mailed without and security whatso ever taken. Hand.led by 
. 
1:r:v\<-~c;;;r c:,.v::1,ey were liable if it wasn't proved to be posi t.ive 
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marijuana .• All the evidence was surpressed, P-l-2-J-4-5 and yet 
due to the conspiracy and prejury involved defendant was foWld gulity. 
P-1. Trans. Pg. 203 L. 5-10 pg. 202 L. 11-25. No identifying 
evidence tag pg. 100 L. J-9, No sample tested. Supposedly 
evidence taken from house, Judge Ronnow ruled the house could 
not be searched under this warrant (Prelimin. trans pg. 
65 L. 1-2. 
P-2. No sample tested pg. 206 L. 11-18 pg. 205 L. 1-9. Sample 
supposedly taken from south of house, which ~as where the 
first three leaves were ta.ken from (which were also 
surpressed). 
P-J. Largest bag where the alledged 110 plants were placed and 
where P-5 was supposedly taken from. (Negative for marijua.11a). 
Pg. 205 L. 25 pg. 206 L 1-10 Pg. 204 L- 8-10 Pg. 204 L 22-23. 
pg. 200 L. 15-25 Pg, 212 L. 1-3. 
P-4. Was a letter supposedly sent by Lynn Cartwright to the State 
·Toxicology lab. Surpressed Pg. 202 L. 7-10 Pg. 203 L. 20-25, 
Pg. 204 L. 1-4. 
Judge Owens then excused the jury (pg. 212 L- 8-9) At approx 5130 
P.H. until 6:30 P.M. Then went on to confinn his surpression orders 
(pg. 213 L. 5-lJ - L- 22-25- Pg, 214 L- 1-14 pg. 215 L. 1-9- pg216 
L. 1-25. At this point the prosecution is trying to locate a. box 
which was taken from P-J which tested negative for marijuana. ( pg. 217 
L. 1-9 Pg. 218 L. 1-18 pg,219 L, 1-15-pg,220 L. 1-16 pg 220 L.1-9. 
While defendant and counsel were to dinner the judge and prosecutor 
met in his chambers and apparently decided many things (consult pg. 
222 L. 3-13) This meeting smacks 0£ conspir3.cy and ma.lieus prosecution 
as well as official mis-conduct- (Consult- pg 284 Vol 2 L. S-8), 
'l'he alledr\"ed evidence is tun1ed over to .an Wlccrtified peace officer. I..> • 
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. 
to be transported to Salt Lake City, Utah 220 miles away with said 
officer knowing he was liable to defendant if evidence were negative. 
Consult pg. 284 L. 11-12. Also consult Attorney Generals brief stating 
the evidence was placed in black garbage bags, first paragraph pg. J. 
and consult Richa...~ Hanna's own testimony Vol l. Pg. 94 L 2-5. Pg. 
97 L, 2 and 3, Black garbage bags were presented at trial consult pg. 
240 L, 4-8, Pg, 240 L. 4-5. Using Judge Owens own words pg. 217 L. J-4 
there's never a motive for substitution, but, then, there the opportun-
ity. 
P-5. Was a sainple which supposedly was ta.ken from P-3 which had 
been tes_ted as negative for marijuana and had been misplaced for 13 
months ( pg. 233 L. 10-18 pg, 234 L. 11-20- pg. 25J L. 1-16. the box 
had been opened several times (consult pg, 233 L, 3-13 pg. 2.50 L. 
5-12 Pg. 255 L 5-11 this shows Dennis and C~ence both access to the 
alled.ged evidence knowing of possible liabilitrT Bruce Beck ( Consult 
Pg, 2.57 L, 12-13 Pg, 267 L. 16-25 pg. 268 L 1-8 pg. 2?6 L. 11-1-21. 
Raymond Goodman another tmcertified· officer pg, 280 L- 5-14 pg 281 
L-1-1.5. Richard Hanna contended that Clarence Hutchinson gave the 
box to him pg 288 L. 10-13 but Hutchinson contended he never seen it 
since November 6, 1980 pg. 234 L, 11-14, This box supposedly tied 
up the loose ends in the chain of possession even though it had been 
lost for thirteen months passed through numersous persons not authorized 
by law to handle it. And then is found and brought to court by Richard 
Hanna the arresting officer and the most likely one to change or 
substitute the evidence because of his lack of certification. 
(Consult pg, 293 L. 9-22) He opened to show the prosecuting attorney 
who is a blind man. 
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ARGUMENT 2 
Thoughout a.11 hearings conspiracy, perjury and inconsistent 
statments were made, False material statements were made by, Richard 
Hanna, Dennis Cox, Clarence Hutchinson, Lynn Cartwright and Raymond 
Goodman. 
The due process guarantee and the fair trial right of the accused 
are destroyed when a prosecutor obtains a conviction with the aid of 
evidence which he actually knows, or should know, to be false and 
allows it to go uncorrected. Deliberate deception of a court and 
jurors by the presentation of false evidence is reprehensible and 
incompatible with "rudimentary demands of justice'; Giglio v. U.S., 
405 U.S. 150 (1982); Napue v. Illinois, J60 U.S. 264 (1959); Mooney v. 
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). It is immaterial whether the prosecutor 
consciously solicited the false evidence. It is also im.~aterial 
whether the false testimony directly concerns an essential element 
of the crime charged or it bears only on the credibility of a witness, 
U.S. v. Barham, 595 F, 2d 231 (5th Cir. 1979). If there is any 
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the 
jury's judgement, a new trial must be ordered. U.S. v. Runge, 59J 
F. 2d 66 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S, Ct, 63 (1979); U.S. v, Antone, 
603 F, 2d 566 (5th Cir. 1979). The prosecutor's duty to correct the 
false testimony arises when the false evidence appears, UoS. v. Sanfilippo, 
565 F. 2d 176 (5th Cir. 1977), or as soon as he becomes aware of 
inaccuracies, u.s. v. Glover, 588 F. 2d 876 {2d Cir. 1978). 
To prove conspiracy, it is not necessary that conspirators 
formally meet or agree to conspire as understanding that the parties 
accomplish the unlawful design may be sufficient to prove conspiracy, 
and presence, companionship, and conduc'I:. before and after the commission 
of the alleged offence may be considered by the jury and are circum-
stances which may give use to an inferrance of the existance of a Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
conspiracy, Price v, State 270 S.E. 2d 20J, (Ga, App. 1980). 
D.C. Md, 1980. In a conspiracy prosecution, proof that at least one 
overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy is sufficient, 
U.S. v. Holland 494 F. Supp. 918, C, A D.c. 1980. A party who know-
ingly joins an unlawful conspiracy may be held responsible for acts 
done in furtherance of the conspiracy both prior to and subsequent 
to his joining- U.S. v, Jackson 627 F, 2d 1198. 
18 U.S. C.A. 1623, United States v. Lococo 450 F. 2d 1196, 
1199 (9th Cir 1971). It is sUfficent for the government to prove 
that the testimony was relevant to any issue under consideration 
by the grand jury, If the falsity of the testimony would have the 
natural tendency to influence the grand jurys investigation it is 
material. 450 F 2d 1199. 
In Carothers V, Rhay (1979 CA 9 Wash.) 594 F, 2d 255 and in 
Lindhorst V. United States (1978), CA 8 Iowa 585 F. 2d )61, The 
prosecution knowingly relied upon prejuried testimony, 
In Moore v. Dempey (1923) 261 U.S. 86, 67 L Ed .51-~3, 43 S Ct 265 
the claim in Moore, that the petitioners criminal trial had been 
controlled by a mob, arguably conformed to the existing frame work. 
A mob dominated trial may be no trial at a.11, and it is a short step 
to the conclusion that the trial court in such a case had no jurisdiction, 
--·-The trial judge relied upon false information in imposing 
the sentence, Gelfuso v. Bell {1978, CA 9 Cal) 590 F 2d 754; 
Moore V, United States (1978, CA 3 NJ) 571F2d179. 
The trial judges conduct rendered the trial unfair, Moore V. 
United States (1979, CA 5 Ga) 598 F 2d 439: Buckelew V. United States 
(1978, CA 5 La.) 575 F 2d 515. 
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ARGUMENT 3 
Violations of Due Process 
In State of Utah vs. Richard Allen Bradshaw case # 80CR9. 
A misdeamonor charge of possesion of big game which came about as 
a result of the same false arrest and illegal search and seizure 
as case #539. This case was tried right in front of # 539. Judge Owens 
denied defendant counsel four different times and then May 1981 in 
Circuit Court Judge Owens found defend.ant guilty of the class B-
misdeamonor. Def end.ant appealled to district court a..."ld the honorable 
Judge J. Harlan Burns remanded case back to Circuit court stating 
that there had been insufficient inquiry into the defendants need 
for appointed counsel and therefore was without due process of law, 
June 2, 1981-June 9, 1981 review was held again in front of Judge 
Owens who again denied appointment of counsel. On the 8th of Sept-
ember, 1981 defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to sl.L..'""-press. 
Trial was held on the 24th of September, 1981, with defendant being 
forced to represent himself. Judge pro-tem Christian Ronnow denied 
hearing the motions and tabled them, Held the trial and found defen-
dant guilty, then scheduled motion hearing in October just two weeks 
before trial of case #5J9. After motions were heard Judge Ronnow took 
them under advis.emen t and has never ma.de an offical ruling even today. 
In this case # 80 CR-9 Defendants rights were severly violated and 
impaired.by this denial of due process in both cases. Pursuant to 
Utah Rules 77-35-8 Rule 8- Rule 9 (1) and 76-1-402 (1) conviction on 
7/,• I ,'/tJ.3(1')'1(3) 
case #80 CR-9 a class B misdeamonor should have acfed a!:. a bar to 
prosecution of case #539 a felony, 76-1-402 (2) & (J), Violations in 
case # 80 CR-9 pursuant to Utah rules, rule 12 (c)- should have been 
settled be:fore case II 539 was heard. Pursuant to Rule JO (a) the errors 
and defects of # 80-CR-9 more than substantial denied defend.ants richts. 
Conviction of lesser offense a::; bar to prosec1xtJ~~ .. ~~ --~"" ..._ ..,,-;-
61 A.L.R. 2d, 111a. 
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• 
IN THE DISTRICT coeRT FOE E:=:J:.VER CO~:}\TY I STATE OF CT.AH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
). 
ORDER £~·:.A!\DING C.!:.SE TO 
vs. 
Rl CHARD ]l_LLEN BR.!illSEAW I 
Defendant. 
CIRCPIT COURT 
Crim. No. 541 
The defendant, Richard Allen Eraas~aw, having been convicted 
in the Circuit Court for Beaver County, State of Utah, of the 
corr~ission of the crine of ?ossession of Big Ga~e Illegally Taken, 
a class A misdernean9r, being case no. 80-CR-9 in said Circuit Court, 
and said defendant having a?p22lec said conviction to the Dist~ic~ 
Court for Beaver County, State of Utah, upon the alleged ground that 
he had asse~ted before said Circuit Court that he ~as inaigent and 
unable to provice his o~~ le~al cou~sel and bad re~uestec the 
appointr..ent of the legal ce:=en5er to represent hi:;n in that action, 
and the ffi3tter having co~e on for ~earins before said District 
Court on the 18th day of May, 1981, ~nd it appearing to the court that 
there had been insufficient inquiry at the Circuit Court level as to 
the need of the defendant :::or an c.ppoint.,1;ent of the public ~ .c ~ ce..1.. enc.er 
and that-=E-:"-:e-convictiori of t~e cefen~ant wit~out his being representec 
by legal counsel ~as, there~ore, ~ithout due process of law: 
IT Is EI:r~EBY C?<.:UErSD that t~e conviction of saic ce::encant is 
reve!:'sec c~::1a ~~/e rr.atter }s re::-,anaed to the Circ:ui t Court for Eea,."-er 
County, S-:- of U::~-h, .:..Or ~.ci.:rr.._he::,/'?1~-eedir.y./,. , / / . 72 . I \1 _ __) (V1 . . ~·
...... - ~ -=- r: 1 ! A / 1/ t; · I 1' h ' 1.IC - e - 1 .f v - I 
.,,--.r,·-...;;>" ..... -- ~-v-- . ; 7 ~h,!f!//49' J{i'):L --~: f:o~-:..cn ~=-~--·~/ 
L-:f .Jtrict ._, ucge. 
On t:;e _~ .. _~~ cay of :~=.y, 1931, I ;-.ai1Ed c. ce>?Y of the for~qoing 
31 a~6ressed as follc~s: ~r. Richayd Allen 
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Where as.Judge Owens tried ·case# 80- CR-9 and found defendant 
guilty, by denying him counsel, Then sentenced the defendant, af~er 
which the defendant appealed, Said Judge should have disqualified 
himself from case # 539, 
ARGUMENT 4 
Lack of Jurisdiction 
Public Notice which was filed in the record five days before 
trial pursuant to title 28 U .S .c .A. 1331 and title 42 U .s .c .A. 198.J, 
Then before trial claimed immunities and reserved all rights pursuant 
to title 5 u.s.c.A. 101-706. This changed the courts jurisdiction 
from the state to the federal district court, because of prior constit-
utionally guaranteed rightq and immunity violations, like false arrest, 
false impersonation, not swearing under oath or affi.rmation to pro-
bable cause, illegal search and seizure, denial of counsel, denial 
of speedy trial etc, Therefore due to these violations, particularly 
the United States fourth amendment violations, the state did not 
have jurisdiction. Neither in District Court or the Utah Supreme Court, 
Said Public Notice was sent to the Utah State Attorney General 
on the 1st of October for protection of defendants rights in case 
# 80- CR-9 and as a warning a.gainist further violations of defendants 
constitutionally guaranteed rights and immunities. On October 29th 
defendant submitted to the Attorney General all the pertinent imfor-
mation concerning case #539 and again requesting protection, Both 
were ignored or denied. Thus allowing a total miscarriage of justice, 
without any reguards of defendants rights as a citizen of the State 
of Utah and of the United States of America, 
CONCLUSIO~~ 
The only excuse the State could offer would be that they had 
acted in good faith. But, (Good Faith) means Honest, honest in fact, 
Good faith means ob:::;ervance of reasonable standards of fdr dealings, 
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Surely, False impersonation for over six years, preventing more 
capable and honester men (and there have been several) from becoming 
the city policeman. Perjury by false documents and under oath, on the 
stand, µi court, Conspiracy in an effort to profit not only politically 
but monetary ways, cannot and should not be considered good faith, 
Where the prosecutor know or should have known that the alledged 
officers were not certified and in fact pursuant to 67- 15- 7 U.C.A. 
were prohibited from exercising any peace officer powers the case 
should have never been prosecuted. This prosecution was continued in 
bad·faith and without jurisdiction, denying defendants rights of 
equal protection, due process, of any priveledges, immu..~ities or 
constitutional rights, 
Its only one short step to the conclusion, that case# 539.has 
been a preversion of our most basic constitutionally rights. That 
good faith is a.~ absolute must in the American Judical systera, that 
in order to t..iphold the law you have to obey the law. In view of these 
facts, totaling all the arguments there is only one conclusion to 
be reached. Case # 539 has been a totaJ. miscarriage of justice, 
therefore it is respectfully submitted that the Supreme Court of Utah, 
correct the errors by reversing the defendants conviction and 
sentence forthwith, 
-lla.ted this ,i'IJ.;Dt day of ~}?., 1982, 
,f4~hi!/l. M~L&u= 
Pro Se Richard Allen Brad.shaw 
CERTIFICATE OF VERIFICATION 
~A-hJ.?u~ 
Richard Allen Bradshaw 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff & Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 18255 
RICHARD ALLEN BRADSHAW, 
Defendant & Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a criminal case where the Defendant and Appel-
lant, RICHARD ALLEN BRADSHAW, is charged with Count I, 
Third-Degree Felony offense of producing or growing marijua-
na; and Count II, possession of Marijuana with the intent to 
distribute for value. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried by a Jury which found the·· Appellant 
guilty of producing or growing marijuana, a Third-Degree Fe-
lony, and guilty of the lesser included offense of simple 
possession, a Class "B" Misdemeanor. He was sentenced to 0 
- 5 years in the State Prison. 
. RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant and Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment, 
2 
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and Judgment in his favor as a matter of law; or that fail-
ing, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant lives in Milford, Beaver County, State of 
Utah. His home in Milford consists of a city lot and a 
small house located thereon. The house is located on a 
small hill or rise in a terrain, that requires a retaining 
wall along its south boundary between the Defendant's proper-
ty and the neighbor's property. (Defendant's Exhibit 12, Re-
cord, P. 131). The retaining wall is approximately 3-1/2 to 
4 feet high, and then the Defendant's property slopes up at 
an angle from the top of the retaining wall up to the south 
edge of his house. At the time this incident took place, a 
plastic fence or shield about 18 inches high was constructed 
on the Defendant's property up the slope from the top of the 
retaining wall. 
104). 
(Motion to Suppress Transcript, Pp. 103 and 
Acting on information from a confidential informant, 
whose name was not disclosed to the Defendant, that marijua-
na was growing on BRADSHAW's property, Milford City Chief of 
Police Officer RICHARD HANNAH and other officers went to the 
Defendant's neighbor's property on October 7th, 1980. (Re-
cord, P. 80, Paragraph 9). The three officers from Beaver 
County and the City of Milford went upon the neighbor's pro-
perty to the south of Defendant's house, and walked up to 
3 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the retaining wall. According to Officer HANNAH's testimo-
ny, they observed suspect plants growing about 2 or 3 feet 
back on Defendant's property behind the blind or plastic 
fence-type structure, which was obviously built to shield or 
hide the plants. Officer COX, a Beaver County Deputy She-
riff, then leaned across the retaining wall and reached into 
the Bradshaw property and plucked three leaves of the plant. 
(Motion to Suppress Transcript, P. 102, line 14). 
The officer then proceeded to the Justice of the 
Peace's office with the three plucked leaves, with the pur-
pose of contacting the Justice of the Peace and requesting a 
search warrant, authorizing a search of Defendant's pre-
mises. On the basis of their observations, and on the basis 
of the leaves which they had plucked and taken with them, 
they requested a search warrant from the Justice of the 
Peace. (Motion to Suppress Transcript, P. 109, lines 20 -
23; P. 111, lines 18 - 25; P. 112, lines 1 - 4). A search 
warrant was issued by the Justice of the Peace (Record, P. 
26), and the three officers, who first had gone t~ the De-
fendant's property, and several other police officers of Bea-
ver C~unty and Milford City, under the direction of RICHARD 
HANNAH, returned to the Defendant's premises at about 6:15 
p.m., on the evening of October 7th, 1980. Upon arriving at 
the BRADSHAW premises, the officers went upon the Defend-
ant's property, and began to search the same. During the 
process of searching the premises, the officers pulled up 
4 
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many suspect plants, and placed them in three black garbage 
sacks. Some of the suspect plants which were seized ·were 
those which the officers had originally seen and plucked 
leaves from, prior to the search. Other plants were obtain-
ed from a structure located behind the house, described as a 
false wall with window panes over it alongside a root eel-
lar. The officers also took suspect plant out of the root 
cellar itself, and remnants of suspect plants and other para-
phernelia out of the house itself.. (Motion to Suppress 
. . 
Transcript, Pp. 84 - 88). Shortly thereafter, the Defendant 
returned to his house after dark just as the search was 
being concluded, whereupon the officers advised him of the 
search, and placed him under arrest for producing a con-
trolled substance and possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute for value. 
The_only written evidence of the search warrant proceed-
ings held before the Justice of the Peace are the affidavit 
and the search warrant themselves. No record of evidence 
taken by the Justice of the Peace was kept, and no verbatim 
recording of testimony or evidence taken was kept. In addi-
tion, the original affidavit in support of the search war-
rant was not executed by the requesting officer, Officer RI-
CHARD HANNAH, in the proper place located at the bottom of 
the affidavit form, which requires his signature and oath be-
fore the Justice of the Peace. However, the requesting of-
ficer, RICHARD HANNAH, did write in his name at the top of 
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the affidavit form in the blank provided for the purpose of 
identifying the person filling out the affidavit. He testi-
fied that he wrote his name at that point on the form, for 
the purpose of identifying himself, and that otherwise he 
did not sign it as an affirmation that the affidavit was cor-
rect. (Motion to Suppress Transcript, P. 122, lines 110 -
125; P. 123, lines 1 - 10). The search warrant was issued 
to "any peace officer of the State of Utah." (Record, P. 
26). 
Other proceedings took place before the Milford Justice 
of the Peace, the Circuit Court, and the District Court for 
Beaver County which are significant to this Appeal. Prima-
rily, they involve the Defendant's objections to the ap-
pointment of an attorney as Public Defender in his case, who 
suffered a conflict of interest, because the same attorney 
was the ·Milford City Attorney, and therefore, represented 
the Milford City Police Chief, the Chief Officer in this 
case. The Beaver County Attorney, in the prosecution rif 
this case, attempted to force the Defendant to accept the 
services of the said Beaver County Public Defender, in spite 
of the conflict of interest. (See Record, Pp. 11 - 14). 
Also, prior to the trial on this case, the Defendant 
filed his Motion to Suppress Evidence seized under the 
search. (Record, P. 55). The Motion to Suppress alleged 
that the evidence seized was inadmissible for the reason 
that the search was illegal and contrary to the constitu-
6 
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tional rights of the Defendant. It also alleged that the 
search warrant was faulty, for the reason that it was based 
on false or incorrect affidavit and was, therefore, issued 
without probable cause, and was obtained by other unlawful 
means. After hearing evidence on Defendant's Motion to Sup-
press, the District Court judge ruled that the initial pluck-
ing of the three leaves was an unreasonable search, and sup-
pressed that evidence, but allowed the search warrant to 
stand, and found that the search.conducted after the search 
warrant was issued was lawful, and that the evidence seized 
after the warrant was admissible evidence against the Defend-
ant. (Motion to Suppress Transcript, Pp. 171-174). 
At the trial, the District Court Judge did not allow 
the admission of the three leaves into evidence, but did 
allow Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 which were the suspect plants 
seized after the search warrant was issued. However, the 
Court initially would not allow the admission of the evi-
dence obtained after the search, for the reason that the Pro-
secution could not lay a proper foundation for th'e admis-
sion, because it had misplaced a box or container in which 
some of the evidence had been mailed to the State Chemist's 
office to be analyzed. Over the objection of the Defendant, 
the Court granted the Prosecution's motion for continuance, 
to allow Prosecution to see if it could find the missing box 
and samples required for the foundation and introduc~ion of 
the seized evidence against the Defendant. After a two-day 
7 
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continuance, the trial was reconvened and the Prosecution re-
called all of its witnesses, and reintroduced all of its evi-
dence, including the missing box or container, which had 
been mailed by the Beaver County Sheriff's Office to the 
State Chemist's office in Ogden, UT, and then returned by 
mail, but misplaced approximately one year's time before it 
was found, and introduced at the trial. 
ARGUMENT I 
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS AGAINST UNLAWFUL OR UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE WERE VIOLATED, AND THE SEIZED EVIDENCE 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED BY THE COURT. SINCE 
THE ONLY EVIDENCE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT WAS THE UN-
LAWFULLY SEIZED EVIDENCE, HIS CONVICTION MUST BE 
REVERSED. 
The Chief of Police, RICHARD HANNAH, and two other offi-
cers, acted on information received from an informant about 
marijuana growing on RICHARD BRADSHAW' s home property locat-
ed in Milford, Utah. They went to a neighbor's property for 
the purpose of viewing Defendant's yard, and looking for ma-
rijuana. They walked up to a retaining wall between the 
neighbor's property and the Defendant's and saw the suspect 
plants. DENNIS COX, Deputy Sheriff, acting on instruction 
from RICHARD HANNAH, reached up and into the Defendant's pro-
perty, and picked three leaves of the plants. They then 
went directly to the Justice of the Peace's office. There, 
they telephoned the County Attorney, and advised him of what 
they had seen and the leaves that they had picked. The 
n 
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County Attorney prepared the affidavit and search warrant, 
and it was transported to Milford. A search warrant was is-
sued by the Justice of the Peace. (Record, P. 26). 
The issue is whether or not the proceeds of ~he search 
should have been suppressed, under the Fruit of the Poison-
ous Tree doctrine. Generally state~, the rule is to "the ef-
feet that evidence which is located by the police as a re-
sult of information and leads obtained from illegally seized 
evidence, constitutes the fruit of the poisonous tree, and 
is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution." (43 ALR 3d 
385). The exclusionary rule is applicable to state criminal 
prosecution. (Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 6 L Ed 2d 1081). 
The rule has been characterized as a means of enforcing a De-
fendant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure. 
( 4 3 ALR 3d 39 4) • 
In this case, Officer HANNAH and Officer COX testified 
that they used the three illegally seized leaves as the part 
of the basis for obtaining the search warrant. (Suppression 
Hearing Transcript, Pp. 109, 111, 132 - 134). After obtain-
ing the warrant, the officers went back and seized the 
plants from which the leaves were plucked, and quantities of 
other plants which were used to convict the Defendant. With-
·out that evidence, there would have been no other evidence 
against the Defendant, and therefore, his conviction may 
stand or fail based on whether or not it should have been ex-
eluded under the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree doctrine. 
n 
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In U. S. v Paroutian, 299 F 2d 486, an agent of an 
apartment owner let peace officers into Graziani's apart-
ment. The officers did not have a search warrant. While 
there, they discovered a false wall in one of the closets. 
Two days later, an officer returned to the apartment and 
linked Defendant Paroutian to the apartment. A month later, 
the officers returned and discovered drugs behind the false 
wall in the closet and a letter which convicted the Defend-
ant. The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 
found that the first two entries into the apartment were un-
lawful; and since the false wall was first noticed during 
the illegal entries, the subsequent discovery of the drugs 
and letter behind the wall were "fruits ·of the poisonous 
tree", and should have been suppressed by the trial court. 
The Court stated at Pa9e 488, last paragraph, that: 
"the purpose of the rule against admission of 
illegally seized evidence is the protection of the 
rights of privacy; by quarantining evidence ga-
thered in this manner, it is hoped that the zeal 
of enforcement agencies for such methods of procu-
ring evidence will be curbed ...• consistent with 
this broad purpose, the rule extends beyond evi-
dence directl.y seized in an unlawful search, to 
prescribe use of all evidence obtained as an in-
direct result of such illegal activity -- the 
-~fruit of the poisonous tree". See also United 
States v Mccunn, 38 F 2d 246; Staples v United 
States, 320 F 2d 817; Simmons v State, 277 P 2d 
196. 
The Prosecution in this case argued that the suspect 
plants were in "plain view" and, therefore, they could have 
obtained the search warrant without the unlawful seizure of 
10 
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the leaves, and the Court so found. Perhaps, they could 
have, but the fact is they did not. They proceeded to vio-
late Defendant's rights against unreasonable search and seiz-
ure, and went upon his property and picked leaves from be-
hind his fence or shield. (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 
P. 157, Lines 13 - 25; P. 158, Lines 1 - 3). 
The illegal seizure of the leaves cannot be severed 
from the search warrant, and the search justified on the 
basis that plain view would have· justified the search with-
out the illegal seizure. 
The limits on Plain View are as follows: 
1) Plain view alone is never enough to justify a war-
rantless seizure; and 
2) The discovery of the evidence must be inadvertent 
(Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 29 L Ed 2d 564. See 
also 68 AmJur 2d, Search, Section 88). The majority opinion 
of the Supreme Court of the United States conclude in the 
case that the Plain View doctrine operates only, where of~ 
ficers have a prior justification for intrusion and came in-
advertently across a piece of evidence. 
In this case, the Chief HANNAH and Deputy COX did not 
inadvertently view the alleged marijuana behind the plastic 
shield or guard located 5 - 6 feet up on the BRADSHAW pre-
mises. They went there specifically looking for the suspect 
marijuana plants, as a result of information from a confiden-
tial informant. When they got there, they reached over or 
11 
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went upon the BRADSHAW property, behind his shield or fence, 
and picked some of the plants. They went directly to the 
Justice of the Peace, and procured a search warrant. Then, 
they went back and seized the plants, and used them as the 
only convicting evidence against the Defendant. 
A similar situation is found in State of Washington v 
Johnson, 559 P 2d 1380, where the Prosecution attempted to 
justify a search of a suitcase and car trunk on the basis of 
the Plain View doctrine. The police stopped a car they sus-
pected of carrying a suitcase containing drugs. The driver 
gave her consent to open the trunk. The officers saw what 
they said were drugs, through a crack in the suitcase. The 
evidence lead to the confession of the Defendant. The Su-· 
preme Court of Washington held that the search of the suit- · 
case was unreasonable, even though the officers could see 
the contents through the crack, because they did not inadver-
tently discover the drugs. They had been informed earlier 
by informants and other information that the suitcase probab-
ly contained drugs. They went looking for them i~ the suit-
case -- very similar to the way Officer HANNAH and Deputy 
COX went looking for marijuana plants behind the BRADSHAW 
fence in this case. The Plain View doctrine did not render 
admissible the narcotics in the Johnson case just cited, 
and does not allow the admission of the seized plants in 
this case under the search warrant, because the plain view 
relied on by the Prosecution did not meet the requirements 
12 
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of the Coolidge v New Hampshire case cited above. 
Since the evidence seized under the search warrant was 
the fruit of the first unlawful search, it should have been 
suppressed by the Trial Court. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS ILLEGAL, FOR THE REA-
SON THAT IT WAS ISSUED ON AN AFFIDAVIT THAT WAS 
NOT PROPERLY EXECUTED OR SIGNED, AS REQUIRED BY 
THE LAW. 
The Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 77-23-3(1) states 
that 11 a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation." 77-23-4(1) states 
constitutional provision that "all evidence to be consider.ed 
by a magistrate in the issuance of a warrant shall be given-. 
on oath ..•• " The Constitution of Utah similarly requires ari 
oath to support the issuance of a search warrant-. 
The affidavit in support of the search warrant was not 
properly signed by the requesting officer, RICHARD HANNAH. 
(Record,-P. 26). HANNAH testified that he wrote his name in 
at the top of the affidavit form, for purposes of identif ica-
tion, but did not sign his name as an affirmation to the af-
fidavit. 
On redirect examination, Mr. HANNAH testified that he 
put his name on the top of the affidavit form to identify 
himself as the peace officer requesting the warrant. (Sup-
pression hearing Transcript, P. 118, Lines 7 - 25). On re-
13 
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cross examination, Officer HANNAH stated again that he wrote 
his name on the affidavit to identify himself, and specifi-
cally the question was asked: 
Line 14, Page 22 
Q "And it was not placed on the document as af-
firmation of your oath that the affidavit was 
correct, was it? 
A "No. Not -- not the top signature." 
Lines 3 - 9, P. 123 
Q CBy Mr. Anderson) I'm talking about the one 
that's in the Court's file. [Record, P. 26] 
If you want to look at it again, you may. I 
think you've looked at it several times." 
A "No, I did not sign that one." 
Q "You did not sign that one that's in the 
Court's file under oath then, did you, before 
Judge Cook?" 
A "No." 
Then Officer HANNAH testified that the affidavit served on 
RICHARD BRADSHAW at the time of his arrest was also not sign-
ed by him on the bottom line, and was a copy of the original 
in the file which did not contain his signature. (Suppres-
sion Hearing Transcript, Pp. 124 - 126.) 
Since the warrant was not based on an oath or affirrna-
tion in writing, it was not properly based in law, and there-
·fore, it was illegal. The proceeds of the search should 
have been suppressed by the Court. 
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ARGUMENT III 
EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT 
WITHOUT THERE BEING A PROPER FOUNDATION OR CHAIN 
OF POSSESSION ESTABLISHED, WHERE THE SAMPLE WAS 
MAILED TO THE STATE CHEMIST AND IDST FOR A YEAR. 
In this case, the chief and only evidence against the 
Defendant were three black plastic bags of material seized 
in the search. 
Exhibit #1 was a plastic bag containing items taken 
from inside the house belonging to the Defendant •. (Trans-
cript of Trial, P. 103). Exhibit #2 was a bag containing ma-
terial seized from the slope along the south of the house. 
(Transcript of Trial, P. 104). Exhibit #3 was a bag contain-
ing material seized from a planter built along the root eel-
lar directly behind the house. (Transcript of Trial, P. 
108). 
It is important for the Court to note that the trial in 
this case was tried in two days, or two segments. The first 
day of the trial was November 9th, 1981; the second day was 
November 12th, 1981. The Court will note that th~re are two 
transcripts. The first is dated November 9th, 1981, and is 
the proceedings of that day; the second is dated November 
12th, 1981, and is the proceedings for that day. 
During the first day of the trial of November 9th, 
1981, the Prosecution offered Exhibits 1, 2, and 3. All 
three were objected to by the Defendant, and the objections 
were sustained. The Court sustained Defendant's objection 
15 
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to Exhibit #1, because there was no evidence that it con-
tained marijuana. (Transcript of Trial, P. 203). Objection 
to Exhibit #2 was sustained, because there was no evidence 
that it contained marijuana. (Transcript of Trial, P. 206). 
Defendant's objection to Exhibit #3 was sustained, because a 
chemical analysis had been run on the material in Exhibit 
#3, and the test results were negative. (Transcript of 
Trial, Pp. 204 -206). 
The Prosecution also introduced testimony over the ob-
jection of Defendant, concerning test run on a box of mate-
rial that was mailed to the state lab, which was not availa-
ble in Court. No exhibit number had been assigned, but it 
was referred to by the number which the State Chemist lab 
had assigned to it: #808. (Transcript of Trial, P. 184, 
Lines 20 - 25; P. 185 - 188). The Prosecution then attempt-
ed to link the box with Exhibit #3, and use it as foundation 
that Exhibit #3 contained marijuana, and was therefore admis-
sible. The Court denied the attempt. In fact, the Court 
sustained the Defendant's objections to all the material evi-
dence against the Defendant (see above for page references> 
on the grounds that there was no proper chain of possession, 
allowing the admission of any of the exhibits or samples. 
(Transcript, Pp. 213 - 219). 
At any rate, on Page 219, Lines 12 - 20, the Court 
stated: 
"Unless these gaps can be patched up in the 
16 
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chain of evidence, I'm afraid my ruling all the. 
way through is going to have to be the same, in 
granting the proffer of Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 in 
evidence [meaning Defendant's objection would be. 
sustained lik~ it had been on other items of evi-
dence]. I will, however, give you an opportunity 
if you feel that you have the witnesses or the abi-
lity to bridge over these gaps to do that. On the 
other hand, if it doesn't appear that that's going 
to be possible, then, probably, we shouldn't take 
any more time trying." 
At this point in the trial, it was clear to the Court, 
the Prosecutor, and the Defense,· that no prima facie case 
had been made out by the Prosecution. He had called all his 
witnesses, and offered all his evidence, and fully presented 
his case to the Jury. The Court was ready to dismiss the 
case and not waste any more time .. 
The situation, at this point, in the trial was this: 
Exhibit #1 was not admissible, because no sample had 
been taken from it, and no evidence had been offered that it 
contained marijuana. 
Exhibit #2 was not admissible for the same reason. 
Exhibit #3 had been found inadmissible, because the che-
mical test on the sample taken from it was negative. 
However, the Prosecution was attempting to reoffer 
Exhibit #3, by claiming a second sample was taken and mailed 
in a box to the State Chemist lab, and the test result of 
that sample was positive. The Court refused to allow the 
Exhibit #3, because a proper chain of possession could not 
be laid for the sample, primarily because it was not 
available at the trial, and no one seemed to know where it 
17 
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was. (Transcript, Pp. 220 - 221). 
The Court then recessed to give the Prosecution a 
chance to find the missing link or package. (Transcript, P. 
221, Lines 18 - 19). 
At 6:30, Court was reconvened. The Prosecution had not 
found the missing link, and requested a continuance to give 
them more time to find the evidence. (Transcript, P. 222, 
Lines 18 - 21). The Defense objected to the continuance. 
(Transcript, P. 222, Lines 23 - 25; P. 223, Lines 1 - 8). 
At this point, the Prosecution had presented its case 
to the Jury, and did not have enough evidence for the case 
to go to the jury; and he was not sure the evidence was avai -
lable. He just wanted a continuance to look for more, or . 
more aptly put, START OVER AGAIN. And that is exactly what 
the Prosecution did. The Court required the Defendant held 
under the charge, and ordered him back in Court November 12, 
1981, at 8:00 a.m., to start trial again. During the three-
day recess, the Prosecution obtained a Court orqer allowing 
Officer HANNAH to take Exhibits #1, #2, and #3 to Salt Lake 
City. (Transcript, P. 284, Lines 5 - 8. Also, see P. 290, 
line 25; P. 291, Line 291; Record, P. 122). Exhibits #1, 
#2, and #3 were turned over on November 10, 1981, to BRUCE 
BECK, the chemist who had testified the day before. Chemist 
BECK analyzed the substance in Exhibits #1, #2, and i3 on 
the 10th; and on the 12th, he was back in Court testifying 
against the Defendant, stating that all three exhibits con-
lA 
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tained marijuana. (Transcript, Pp. 261 - 264). 
In addition to the new test and Mr. BECK, the Prosecu-
tion recalled CLARENCE HUTCHINSON, GARY LYNN CARTWRIGHT, and 
RICHARD HANNAH, who had all been witnesses during the Novem-
ber 9th trial, and rehashed all the testimonies previously 
solicited, plus testimony on new items of evidence, which 
they did not have at the November 9th trial. In addition, 
the Prosecution called two additional witnesses against the 
Defendant, RAYMOND C. GOODWIN and PAUL BARTON, who supplied 
the missing link in the evidence that was unavailable or 
lost to the November 9th trial. 
One of the items of evidence rehashed by the Prosecu-
tion was the box that was mailed to the State Chemist lab.· 
It had not been in the possession of the Prosecution during 
the November 9th trial, because it had been misplaced and 
lost for. a year, and no one knew where it was at. So, no ex-
hibit number had been assigned to it. BRUCE BECK, the che-
mist, referred to the Test # 808, as coming from the box. 
At the November 12th trial, th~ box was produced, 
having been located during the three-day recess by Officer 
HANNAH in the file cabinet in Milford. (Transcript, Pp. 
288, 290, Lines 1 - 11). The history of the box is as fol-
lows: 
About November, 1981, CLARENCE HUTCHINSON, Deputy She-
riff,- jailer and keeper of evidence in Beaver County, took a 
sample from Exhibits #1, #2, and #3. He thought maybe it 
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was from #3, and put it in a box, which he wrapped and pre-
pared for mailing, by writing the Sheriff's return address 
on the wrapping. (Transcript, P. 230). Mr. HUTCHINSON real-
ly did not know for sure where he got the sample. (Trans-
cript, P. 229, Lines 22 - 25; P. 230, Lines 1 - 6. See 
also, Trial Court's Comments, P. 216, Lines 17 - 22). But 
he did not write the mailing address because he did not know 
it. Instead, he put it on the Sheriff's desk, and called 
the Sheriff to advise him to mail it the next day. This 
took place about November 6th, 1980, in the evening and 
night hour when Deputy HUTCHINSON was on duty. He went off 
duty at midnight. (Transcript, P. 236). 
Sheriff CARTWRIGHT came to work the next day at 8:00 
a.m. He found his door locked, but each of his deputies 
have a key. (Transcript, P. 250, Lines 8 - 9). He found 
the box,· looked up the address, and addressed the box to the 
State Medical Examiner's office, but not particularly to 
BRUCE BECK, who he did not know. (Transcript, P. 250, Lines 
·, 
17 - 23). The box sat around the Sheriff's office until 
noon, when he mailed it. (Transcript, P. 252, Line 18). 
That was the last time he saw it until November 12th, 1981, 
at the trial. (Transcript, P. 252). 
BRUCE BECK, State Chemist, testified as follows: He got 
the box in the mail, November 18th, 1980 (Transcript, P. 
256, Line 16) through a mailroom downstairs in the building 
he works in. Sixty people work in the building. Two or 
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three or more work in the mailroom. (Transcript, P. 269, 
Lines 21 - 25; P. 270, Lines 1 - 6). The mail people put 
the mail in different slots, then the secretary or somebody 
picks up the mail in the mailroom and delivers it_ to the va-
rious departments. This is what happened to the box, now 
marked Exhibit #5, to the best of Mr. BECK's knowledge, but 
he really did not know who had handled the box, or how he 
came to have it. (Transcript, P. 269 - 271). 
The package was returned to Mr. GOODWIN, on December 
22nd, 1980. (Transcript, P. 279, Lines 2 - 5). Then it was 
lost, until discovered after the November 9th trial, and 
brought to the November 12th trial. 
The issue is whether or not Exhibit ts, the box contain-
ing a sample from maybe Exhibits #1, #2, or #3, which was 
mailed through ordinary mail, which was or could have been 
handled.by dozens of unknown persons, can be properly used 
as evidence against the Defendant. 
"Articles or objects which relate to or tend 
to elucidate or explain the issues ..• are admissi-
ble in evidence, when duly identified and shown to 
be in substantially the same condition as at the 
time in issue. In most cases, it is not possible 
to establish the identity in question by a single 
witness, since the object or article has usually 
passed through several hands before being analyzed 
or examined, or being produced in Court, and under 
such circumstances, it is necessary to establish a 
complete chain of evidence, tracing the possession 
of the object or article to the final custodian, 
and if one link in the chain is missing, the ob-
ject or article cannot be introduced. 
The party offering the object or article in 
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evidence must show that, taking all the circums-
tances into account, including the ease or diffi-
culty with which the particular object or article 
could have been altered, it was reasonably certain 
that there was no material alteration •.. " 
(29 AmJur 2d, P. 844, 845, Section 774). 
In this case, Exhibit #5 was passed to an unknown num-
her of postal clerks, and an unknown number of state or pri-
vate workers in the building where Mr. BECK works. It can-
not be said that the Prosecution satisfied with a reasonable 
certainty that there was no mate'rial alteration of the Exhi-
bit #5 before it was introduced into Court, or for that mat-
ter, before it was tested on or about November 18th, 1980, 
and therefore, reasonably certain that the test results were 
admissible against the Defendant. 
Exhibit #5 should have been denied admission by the 
Court, and also Exhibit #3, the plastic bag containing the 
material from which Exhibit 5 came, because Exhibit #3 can-
not be any more reliable than its sample, and also because 
during the November. 9th trial, the sample taken from Exhibit 
#3 was negative. 
The Trial Court also allowed evidence introduced with-
out a proper chain of possession, because Utah Code of Cri-
minal Procedure, Section 77-23-8, requires the officer seiz-
ing the property to be responsible for it and its safekeep-
ing and maintenance "UNTIL THE COURT OTHERWISE ORDERS." 
In this case, the seized evidence was turned over by Officer 
HANNAH to Officer HUTCHINSON, who turned over some of it to 
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the Sheriff, who gave it to an unknown number of postal 
clerks. Other items were delivered to the State Chemist 
office, who returned them to Officer GOODWIN. Then some of 
the items were misplaced for nearly a year. The handling of 
the evidence in this case grossly violates the requirements 
of UCA 77-23-8, and common law requirements of proper chain 
of possession in order for it to be properly introduced into 
evidence against the Defendant. 
ARGUMENT IV 
THE DEFENDANT WAS TWICE PLACED IN JEOPARDY 
CONTRARY TO HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
Reference is made to the factual sequences of the trial 
set out above in Argument No. III. As pointed out, at the 
end of the trial on November 9th, 1981, the Prosecution had 
presented all of its evidence, called all of its witnesses, 
and was unable to muster up enough evidence against the De-
fendant to even put. the question to the Jury. (Transcript, 
P. 219). 
A continuance was granted the Prosecution until Novem-
ber 12, to allow time for the Police to see if they could 
find more evidence against the Defendant. To that end, they 
took Exhibits #1, #2, and #3 to Salt Lake, and had them 
tested by Witness BECK. Then on November 12th, 1981, the 
Prosecution started over again and recalled all of its wit-
nesses, and reoffered all of its evidence, plus offered new-
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ly discovered evidence against the Defendant, all over De-
fendant's objection of surprise and prejudice. (Transcript, 
P. 222, Line 23; Motion to Dismiss Transcript, P. 228, Line 
9; Record, P. 120 - 121). 
The Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12, provides 
that: " .•. Nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense." The Utah Criminal Code provides, at UCA 
76-1-403(2), that: 
"there is an acquittal if the Prosecution re-
sulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier of 
facts, or in a determination that there was insuf-
ficient evidence to warrant conviction." (Empha-
sis added.> 
Certainly, the Defendant was placed in jeopardy when 
the jury was empanelled on November 9th, and the Prosecution 
presented all the evidence it had at that time against the . 
Defendant. Certainly, the Trial Judge was ready to dismiss 
the case for insufficient evidence, even though he was care-
ful not to articulate his feelings in so many words. Cer-
tainly, there was in fact insufficient evidence at that 
point to warrant a conviction as a matter of law. General-
ly, the discharge of the Jury on account of the Prosecution 
being unable to proceed with the trial operates as an acquit-
tal, and the accused cannot be again prosecuted for the same 
offense. (21 AmJur 2d, Criminal Law, Section 196; Carnero 
v U. S., 48 F 2d 69; Hipple v State, 191 S.W. 1150; Piza-
no v State, 20 Tex. app. 139; Allen v State, 52 Fla. 1, 
41 So. 593.) 
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In Hunter v Wade, 169 F. 2d 973, the Court stated: 
"However, the constitutional guaranty pro-
tects an accused against a second trial, where the 
jury in the first trial was discharged solely on-
the ground that witnesses for the government were 
absent, and threfore, their testimony could not be 
adduced." 
In the Utah case of State v Ambrose, 598 P2d 354, the Su-
preme Court of Utah declared that a mistrial after improper 
remarks by the Prosecution, was a bar to subsequent trial 
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. of the Utah's Constitution. 
Certainly, there is no difference between the substance of a 
mistrial and the substance of this case. By all equitable 
and legal standards in our American system of justice, RI-
CHARD ALLEN BRADSHAW had been placed in jeopardy and tried 
that day, November 9th, 1981, and the Prosecution was found 
con1pletely lacking. But rather than dismissing the case, 
the Trial Judge and the Prosecution used the technicality of 
continuance in order to allow the Prosecution a chance to re-
construct, redo, and represent its case to the Jury. As a 
result, RICHARD ALLEN BRADSHAW was again placed ~n jeopardy 
', 
on November 12, 1981, when the same case was retried contra-
ry to his constitutional rights, and his conviction should 
be reversed and the case against him dismissed. 
ARGUMENT V 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, AND TO AN 
ATTORNEY .WITH UNDIVIDED LOYALTY OFFERING DEFENDANT 
TIMELY REPRESENTATION. 
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Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 77-32-1 requires that 
the following minimum standards of representation be provid-
ed by government entities for the defense of indigent per-
sons: 
"C 1) Provide counsel for every indigent per-
son ...• " 
(2) Afford timely representation by compe-
tent legal counsel ••. 
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense 
counsel to the client." 
Also, the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12, provides 
for a speedy public trial. 
Defendant was arrested on this offense on October 7th, 
1980. (Record, P. 11). On October 24th, he appeared befqre 
the Justice of the Peace, and was formally charged with the 
offense. (Record, P. 11 and 25). On that day, he requested 
a Public Defender, and one LEO KANELL of Milford was appoin-
ted. (Record, P. 11). Thereafter, the Defendant objected 
to LEO KANELL acting as his counsel, because he also repre-
sented the City of Milford which employed several of the of-
ficers who searched his premises and arrested him, and who 
would be witnesses against him. (Suppression Hearing Trans-
script, P. 28 - 41). Defendant BRADSHAW discharged Mr. KA-
NELL on November 13th, 1980, and the County Attorney was so 
advised. (Record, P. 12). On November 19th, 1980, Attorney 
KANELL filed his Motion for Withdrawal, which was approved 
by Judge Cook. (Record, P. 31). On December 30th, 1980, 
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the Defendant again requested an attorney other than KANELL. 
(Record, P. 12). The Beaver County Attorney, JOHN CHRIS-
TIANSEN, advised Mr. BRADSHAW that Mr. KANELL was the -Public 
Defender, and no other attorney would be appointed. (Re-
cord, P. 13, Paragraph C). 
On January 19th, 1981, the Defendant filed an affidavit 
pro se, asking for an attorney other than KANELL. (Record, 
P. 36). On January 28th, 1981, the County Attorney filed No-. 
tice of Preliminary Hearing and of Appointment of Public De-
fender, LEO KANELL, and advised the Defendant he must accept 
LEO KANELL as his attorney, or proceed without an attorney. 
(Record, P. 39) • 
On February 2nd, 1981, RICHARD BRADSHAW filed another 
Request for Appointment of Public Defender other than LEO KA-
NELL, because of his conflict of interest. (Record, P. 41 -
42). Again, on February 4th, 1981, the County Attorney 
filed his response, and again demanded that Defendant BRAD-
SHAW accept Mr. KANELL or proceed with Preliminary Hearing 
without an attorney. (Record, Pp. 43 - 44}. ~ 
Thereafter, about February 26th, 1981, SCOTT THORLEY 
was appointed to represent RICHARD BRADSHAW, who filed a Mo-
tion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute and Failure to Pro-
vide Defendant with Counsel meeting the minimum standard pro-
vided by 77-35-8. (Record, P. 6). Preliminary Hearing was 
held March 26th, 1981, 170 days after the Defendant's ar-
rest, contrary to Rule 77-35-7(4)(c) of the Utah Rules of 
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Criminal Procedure, which provides for a Preliminary Hearing 
within 30 days when the Defendant is not in custody. 
SCOTT THORLEY withdrew April 10th, 1981. (Record, P. 
47). Defendant BRADSHAW filed another Request for Legal 
Counsel April 10th, 1981 (Record, P. 48). JUDGE BURNS allow-
ed the withdrawal of SCOTT THORLEY April 22nd, 1981. (Re-
cord, P. 50). DEXTER L. ANDERSON was appointed to represent 
the Defendant April 15th, 1981, (Record, P. 52) and advised 
of trial about June 8th, 1981. (Record, P. 53). A Second Mo-
tion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute and Provide an At-
torney was filed August 7th, 1981. (Record, P. 66). Trial 
was finally held on this case on November 9th, 1981, or 398 
days following Mr. BRADSHAW's arrest. 
A reading of the record discloses that the primary rea~ 
son for the delay was the Prosecution's attempt to force the 
Defendant to accept the services of LEO KANELL, who was 
under a conflict of interest in the case, and could not pro-
vide the minimum standards required. Such violation of the 
Defendant's rights under 77-32-1, and such a subs~antial 
delay in the Defendant's prosecution as a result certainly 
was a denial of his right to a speedy trial, and his convic-
tion should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT VI 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR A JURY TO 
FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE 
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DOUBT AS A MATTER OF LAW, BECAUSE THERE WAS ABSO-
LUTELY NO EVIDENCE IDENTIFYING THE DEFENDANT WITH 
THE CORPUS DELICTI. 
In this case, if all of the Prosecution's evidence are 
allowed; i.e., 3 bags of plant material, samples, and testi-
mony of the police that the materials were found growing on 
the BRADSHAW premises, and of the State Chemist who testi-
fied that the plants were marijuana, then the Prosecution 
proved the Corpus Delicti of the crime, or that the crime 
was committed. However, the Prosecution failed to prove 
identity. They failed to prove that RICHARD ALLEN BRADSHAW 
was the person who committed the crime. 
"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the iden-
tity of the accused as the person who committed 
the crime is essential to a conviction." 30 AmJur 
2d, Evidence, P. 319, Section 1143. 
The Prosecution's evidence was to the effect that the 
Defendant BRADSHAW was not present when the search was made. 
He was arrested when he came back to the house from the hos-
pital. He never made any confession or admission against in-
terest. No marijuana was found on his person, none was 
found in the vehicle he drove up in. No one saw him working 
with the alleged marijuana. 
In addition to the Defendant, his wife lived at the re-
sidence, and during the Christmas tree cutting season, a Mr. 
FORDHAM lived at the house. Many other people came and went 
at the house, including brothers of the Defendant, his mo-
ther, and friends. (Transcript, Pp. 144 - 149). There sim-
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ply was no evidence at the trial which pointed to the Defend-
ant over any one of a number of different people. There was 
no identification of the Defendant as being the person who 
produced or cultivated the alleged ma.rijuana or processed 
it. All of the evidence cut against everyone else who lived 
at or frequented the house. Such evidence fails to prove 
the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the ele-
ment of identify, and the Jury's verdict on that point was 
pure speculation. The Defendant's conviction should be re-
versed by the Supreme Court, for failure of any evidence 
pointing to the Defendant as the one responsible for the of-
fense as against any number of other people. 
CONCLUSION 
RICHARD ALLEN BRADSHAW was convicted of a Third-Degree 
Felony and a Class "B" Misdemeanor of producing marijuana 
and possession of it. The first search against him was 
ruled illegal by the Trial Court. But the Trial Court al-
lowed the use of evidence seized during the second search, 
following the obtaining of a search warrant, even though the 
search warrant was in effect based on the first illegal 
search. The evidence seized during the Second Warrant 
Search should have been suppressed and the case dismissed be-
cause it was the only evidence against the Defendant. 
The evid,ence should also have been suppressed for the 
reason that the affidavit upon which the warrant was issued 
30 
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was unsigned as an oath or affirmation by the officer re-
questing it. Once the evidence was suppressed, there would 
have been no case at all against the Defendant, and it 
should have been dismissed. 
The evidence against the Defendant should also have 
been suppressed because the Prosecution failed to establish 
a proper chain of possession. The Court erred when it allow-
ed the use of sample evidence against the Defendant that had 
been rr~iled by ordinary mail to be analyzed, and which had 
to be handled by-many unknown people. Also, the Prosecution 
failed to show proper chain of possession where evidence and 
sample were passed haphazardly from one person to the next, 
with the Court order required by the Utah Code of Criminal·. 
Procedure. 
The Defendant was twice placed in jeopardy when the Pro-
secution presented all its evidence and testimony on Novem-
ber 9th, 1981, and failed to make a case; but the Court al-
lowed a continuance for two days to allow the Prosecution to 
redo its case. Thereafter, on November 12th, 1981, the Pro-
secution reoffered all its evidence and testimony plus new 
evidence, and retried the case against the Defendant. 
The Defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial 
and minimum representation, when the Prosecution attempted 
to force him to accept the services of a Public Defender who 
suffered a serious conflict of interest. 
The Prosecution also failed to produce any evidence 
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that identified the Defendant as the one who committed the 
offenses alleged. 
The search warrant and proceedings also failed to meet 
the requirements of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure. 
Any one of the arguments presented above is sufficient 
to reverse the Defendant's conviction. But when all the er-
rors are added up, the case is a complete miscarriage of 
justice and a perversion of the American criminal process by 
both the Police and the Prosecution. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Supreme Court of 
Utah correct the errors by reversing the Defendant's convic-
tion. 
DATED this ( L day of May, 1982. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct cooy of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to DAVID L. WILKINSON,~Attorney 
General, and ROBERT N. PARRISH, Assistant Attorney General, 
both of 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114; to JOHN 
CHRISTENSEN, Beaver County Attorney, Beaver, UT; and to RI-
CHARD ALLEN BRADSHAW, Defendant, Utah State Penitentiary, 
Draper, UT., postage prepaid, this -LL-day of May, 1982. 
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